pool Fwd: Special issue of DGAA in Macroeconomics

Posted on 2013/10/01. Filed under: 綜合 |

Dynamic Games and Applications

Special Issue on Dynamic Games in Macroeconomics

Guest Editors:

Edward C. Prescott, Arizona State University, Edward.Prescott(at)asu.edu

Kevin Reffett, Arizona State University, Kevin.Reffett(at)asu.edu

Many important questions in macroeconomics require the use of dynamic game theory tools. For example, problems involving optimal time-consistent fiscal and/or monetary policy in various dynamic general equilibrium models under in the presence of limited commitment for government policymakers use them. Related problems with limited commitment arise in dynamic optimization models where decision-makers possess dynamically inconsistent preferences, such as models where agents discount the future at hyperbolic or quasi-geometric rates. Additionally, recent work characterizing the structure of optimal dynamic financial contracts written between private agents interacting over time in dynamic resource allocation problems in the presence of limited commitment and incomplete information have been studied using the language of dynamic games. Additional macroeconomic applications requiring the use of dynamic game theory tools in macroeconomics include such diverse problems as the design of economic policy in models of international trade, environmental macroeconomics (including models of climate policy, global pollution control, etc.), various problems in dynamic mechanism design, models of strategic default and sovereign debt renegotiation, and dynamic models with moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, policy being a game and economic activity takes place over time, dynamic game theory tools are needed for virtually policy analyses.

In 2015, Dynamic Games and Applications will publish a special volume concerning recent work in this very active area of research in macroeconomics. This special issue welcomes submissions from theoreticians and applied researchers working on all aspects of dynamic games and macroeconomics. In particular, we are interested in (but not limited to) papers concerned with the following areas:

· Time consistent optimal policy design in dynamic general equilibrium models

· Dynamic asset pricing models with strategic default with endogenous borrowing constraint, including models of sovereign debt and debt renegotiation

· Dynamic general equilibrium models where agents possess dynamically inconsistent preferences (e.g., models where agents have preferences with hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic discounting)

· Strategic dynamic programming/APS methods for computing models with limited commitment with complete or incomplete information

· Incentive constrained dynamic programming/recursive saddle point methods for characterizing dynamic equilibria in economies with limited commitment

· Stochastic games and their applications to dynamic macroeconomic models with limited commitment

· Strategic models of environmental macroeconomics, including work in climate and pollution externalities

· Robust control methods and their application to strategic policy designs questions in dynamic general equilibrium models

· New recursive methods for computing dynamic economies with strategic interactions

Submission Deadline: August 30, 2014

Earlier submission is encouraged, and papers will appear online following acceptance in advance of the production of the full special issue.

Publication Date: December, 2015

For submission instructions, please visit:

http://www.springer.com/mathematics/applications/journal/13235

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